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~;- J. \\. Sul\n.IERHAYs & SoNs 
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the Estate of Bert N. Bailey, 
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WHITEHILL; C. E. SuMMERHAYS 
and J. J. SuMMERHAYs, 
Defendants a;nd Appellants, 
JoHN ScowcROFT & SoNs CoM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defenda(fl;t not appealimg. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
JosEPH F. l\fERRILL, 
Plaintiff wnd Respo~dent ~ 
vs. 
BAILEY & SoNs CoMPANY, a· .cor-
poration; SEYMOUR N. BAILEY 
and ·EMMA Z. BAILEY, his wife; 
J. \Y. SuMMERHAYs & SoNs 
CoMPANY, a corporation; CoLo-
RADO ANIMAL BY-PRonucTs CoM-
PANY, a corpo:rntion; LEONA B. 
WHITEHILL, administratrix of 
the Estate of Bert N. Bailey, 
D e c e a s e d ; RoBERT BAILEY 
WHITEHILL; C. E. SuMMERHAYS 
and J. J. SuMMERHAYs, 
Defenda;nts and Appella;nts, 
JoHN ScowcROFT & SoNs CoM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant not appealing. 
No. 6219 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE C.AS:E. 
This is an appeal from a judgment or decree of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, Hon. P. C. 
Evans, Judge thereof, in an action broug1ht by plaintiff 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
to quiet his title to 1certain real property in Salt Lake 
City, and situate ·on the east side of 3rd West Street, Be-
tween 4th and 5th South 'Streets, in •said City, and known 
and deseribed as the 1South 1f2 of Lot 3, Block 43, Blat 
"A'', Salt Lake City Survey. 
Plaintiff's complaint is in the usual form for an ac-
tion to quiet title, and prays that title to the real estate 
be quieted in plaintiff ag~inst "all claims of title to, 
interest in or easement ·over or upon said Land asserted 
by defendants or any of them,'' and also prays that de-
fendants, and each of them, be restrained and enjoined 
from driving trucks or other veihides over or upon, or 
from otherwise taking possession of or using ''1all or any 
portion of plaintiff's real estate for any purpose ·what-
soever," and that defendnats be required to remove from 
plaintiff's land a ·Certain concre'te loading pl1atform and 
ramp located there·on. (Ab. 1-4). Defendants separately 
answered, denying plaintiff's daim of title to •said prop-
erty unencumbered by any easement or right ~of way in 
favor of defendants, and setting up their ·separate and 
several -ownership of ·Certain parcels of land in Lot 2 of 
said .Block and Plat a.fores1aid immediately a;dj.oining 
plaintiff'·s said lands on the south, and alleging in detail 
the ·creation and their ownership by grant, reservation 
and use by the rcommon grantors of the parties and their 
succes.sor·s in intere>st, of certain easements, rig1hts of way 
and other rights and privileges, •Over, upon and in and 
concerning plaintiff's said land, for the use and benefit 
of defendants' ·said lands in Lot 2 1aforesaid (Ab. 5-56). 
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Plaintiff replied to defendants' several answer's, ad-
mitting defendants to be the owners of the several parcels 
of land adjoining plaintiff's property ~lleged in their 
answers, and further admitting that defendants own, and 
as alleged by them, are entitled to 'certain easements, 
rights ·Of way and rights and privileges over, in and upon 
plaintiff's land, for the use a.nd benefit of their ·said la~ds 
in Lot 2, but denying that said easements, rights of way 
a.nd privileges are as extensive as alleged by defendants; 
and ·plaintiff further admitted 1Jhat when he became the 
owner of ·his said land, there was constructed and open, 
vi·sible, obvious and apparent, and in use by defendants 
thereon, a railroad spur track and .certain lumber loading 
platfonns; and he alleged that thereafter defendants re-
moved a portion of such lumber loading platforms and 
replaced the s:ame with a ·concrete platform and ramp 
covering a larger area than that covered by the lumber 
platform, and that the burden upon plaintiff's·1and was 
thereby increased :and the servitude thereon attempted 
to be enlarged, and prayed that plaintiff have judgment 
as prayed in his complaint. (Ab. 56-75). Based upon 
these replies, defendants moved the 'Court for a judg-
ment on the pleadings upon the grounds, among others, 
that the said replies are complete departures from plain-
tiff's complaint and constitute admissions of defendants' 
defenses, claims and demands in their answers contained, 
(Ab. 75-76), which m~tion was by the Court denie4, and 
the case was tried to the Court without a jury, and re-
sulted in a judgment or decree which, by its terms, and 
in entire disregard of the grants 1and reservations con-
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tained in the deeds of defendants and their predecessor.s 
in interest, excludes defendants from all ,of plaintiff's 
property north of ·said railroad spur track, as well as 
some ·south thereof, 1and restricts defendants' easements 
and rights of way, and other rights and privileges over, 
in and ·Concerning plaintiff's land, to use of said railroad 
spur track situate thereon, and a small portion of plain-
tiff'·s ground to the south of such spur track (Ab. 169-
176). Tihe decree further requires the removal of the 
entire ·concrete loading platform and ramp constructed 
thereon pursuant to the right given and reserved in the 
deeds of defendants and their predecessors in interest, 
and it is to review this judgment or decree that this ap-
peal has been perfected. 
STATE.MENT OF F .ACTS. 
As •shown by the abstract of title No. 77394 prepared 
by t'he Utah Savings & Trust Abstract Company, wlhich 
was received in evidence'· and will be herein referred to as 
Exhibit "X", and 1as is als,o admitted by the pleadings 
in the case, the grants and reservations, by which the 
common grantors of plaintiff and de~endants granted and 
reserved the ~easements and rights whiclh de\fendants 
daim over and concerning plaintiff'·s land, are contained 
in 'a 1certain deed dated August 9, 19·23, from Bert N. 
Bailey and wife, and defendants, Seymour N. Bailey and 
Emma Z. Bailey, his wife (Bert N. Bailey and Seymour 
N. Bailey being the common g:mntor.s of plaintiff and 
defendants ,of all of the property here involved), to de-
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fendant Bailey & Sons Company, and covering certain of 
defendants' property in said Lot 2, and reading, so far 
as the grant of the easements and rights in plaintiff's 
land are concerned, as follows: 
"together with the trackage privilege now in use 
1at the North end of said property. * * * 
* * '' Als,o a perpetual Right to tihe use 
of the railroad spur together with the team, track 
and auto drive along the North line thereof and 
the platform for loading and unloading from ve-
hides ~and cars, through and over a part of the 
South 1;2 of Lot 3, of said Block and Plat as at 
present constituted, with a Rig1ht to repair, re-
construct or rebuild t·he same as shall from time 
to time become nece.ssary within its present loca-
tion. 
''Also a perpetlllal Right of Way for ingress, 
egress and regress f.nr all purposes over the fol-
lowing strip of ground, to-wit: Commencing 99 
feet East of the Northwest corner of said Lot 2, 
running thence South 76 feet; thence West 403~ 
feet; tJhence North lOlJ2 feet; thence E·ast 303~ 
feet; thence North 651;2 feet; thence East 10 feet 
to the pla.ce of beginning, to· be kept open for 
loading and unloading goods, merdhandise and 
other commodities from the platform 1along the. 
South line of Lot 3, B1oek and Plat aforesaid, 
above referred t·o, together with the right of main-
taining a. cover or roof over said platform at the 
North end of said Right .o.f Way." (Exhiibit "X", 
No. 25); 
and a certain other deed of the ·same date from defend-
ants, Seymour N. Bailey and wife to Bert N, Bailey, 
covering said defendants' undivided one-half interest in 
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what is now plaintiff's property, and reserving said ease-
ments and rights of way to and for the use of ·said Lot 
2, in this language : 
''Reserving, however, to the gl'lantors the per-
petual Right to ·the maintenance and use nf the 
platform now located on t•he Southern portion ~of 
said premises about 10 feet wide including the 
overlapping roof for said platform including also 
the curve there,of along the railWJay spur as at 
present •Constructed, with full right to repair, re-
construct or rebuild the same within its present 
lo-catioJt. 
'' A1.so reserving the perpetual Right to the 
use ·of the trackage over and along the South line 
·Of said premises and to the premises wnd to the 
team, tra:ck or auto drive along the said track, all 
to be used in corvnection arnd for the convenience 
of Lot 2, of said Block for the loading and wn.load-
ing of mercha;ndise. 
''It is also hereby agreed that without the 
oonsent of grantor, Seymour N. Bailey, or his as-
signS, that no right shall he granted for tlhe use 
of said railway spur beyond the East end of said 
Lot 3." (Exhibit ''X", No. 23); 
and the deed by which plaintiff acquired ·title to his s1a.id 
land from the Bailey brothers' succe.ssor in interest there-
to, •On~ Walter H. Dayton, dated Augttst 2'8, 1928, con-
tained a reference to defendants' ·said easements and 
other rights, in this language: 
''Subject to loading and trackage easements ~tc.'' (Exhibit "X", No. 51). ' 
The material facts in the ease are not in dispute and 
may be summarized as follows : 
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1. In 1905 and 1906, the defendant, Seymour N. 
Bailey, and his brother, Bert N. Bailey (now deceased) 
acquired~ as tenants in c01nnwn, the South lf2 of Lot 3, 
Bl1ock 43, being- the property now owned by plaintiff (Ex-
hibit "X'', Nns. 5-8), and about the same time the two 
brothers also acquired some property in Lot 2 of the 
san1e block, and immediately adjoining said property on 
the south, and from time to time thereafter, the two 
brothers also acquired other property in .said Lot 2, 
until eYentually and by the year 19·15, they had acquired 
and owned all of the property here involved, both plain-
tiff's and all of defendants, except the easterly piece of 
what is now the John Scowcroft & Sons •Company prop-
erty, which was previously owned by and known as the 
Fratello p:r.operty (Ex. "X", N·os. 8-20), and whieh is 
not involved upon 'tihis appe~l. 
2. In 1907, and while so owning plaintiff's property 
and the property which they had a:cquired in said Lot 2, 
adjoining plaintiff's property on the South, the two Bailey 
br.others constructed, or caused to be constructed, a rail-
road spur i:rock upon .and across what is now plaintiff's 
property, and at or about the same time, or shortly there-
after erected a warehouse building· on their property in 
1Jhe northwest corner .of said Lot 2 ( Cudahy-N orth·west-
ern Hide Company building), and certain loading pl:a t-
forms on the southern portion of plaintiff's land ad-
jacent to the north side of this building-, and along the 
s~outh side of the spur track, to serve their warehouse 
building .so constructed. Fron1 time to time thereafter, 
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the Bailey brothers erected other WJarehouse buildings 
on the property tJhey .a,cquired in said Lot 2, and con-
structed other and additional loading plat£orms and ·Other 
facilities on what is now plaintiff's property, to serve 
sueh warehouse buildings, including 1a concrete team, 
truck and auto drive to the north of the spur track to 
facilitate the movement of wagons, and later trueks, in 
loading on the north side of the spur to and from box cars 
thereon, and also to and from the loading platforms ad-
joining the spur .on tJhe south ·side thereof; and a hay 
barn, stable and other buildings were also constructed on 
what is now plaintiff'.s land, to the north of this concrete 
team, truck and ,auto drive, and at the east end thereof 
a warehouse building, now known as the Globe Mills 
building, was constructed. 
In ·connection with tihe ·eonstruction of the buildings 
facing on 5tJh South Street (Summerhays and Seymour 
N. Bailey buildings), whieh were eonstructed some time 
after the Northwestern Hide-Cudahy building, there was 
constructed, at the east end of the Northwestern Hide 
building, a passage or runway about 10 feet wide running 
from the loading platforms and spur track in a southerly 
direction into and to serve these buildings, whieh had 
no direct access to the loading platforms, tlhe ·spur track 
and other facilities so eonstructed on what is now plain-
tiff's property, and these buildings ever since have been 
and still are served by these loading platforms, spur 
traek, team, track and auto drive and .other faeilities on 
plaintiff's property through the said runway. The loca-
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tion of the various properties involved and the buildings 
and facilities erected and constructed thereon may he 
readily under·stood by referring to Exhibit 7 and the 
photographs, Exhibits 1 to 6, inclusive. 
3. From the time of the eonstrnetion of these vari-
ous buildings and facilities, the entire South lf2 of Lot 3 
(plaintiff'.s property) was used for the benefit of arnd to 
serve the Bailey ibrothers' pr.operty in Lot 2, and the 
warehouse buildings constructed thereon-the facilitie,s 
on said South 1f2 of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property) having 
been constructed and designed to serve the then owners' 
property in Lot 2. Tlhroughout the years down to the 
present time, merchandise ·has been loaded to and from 
railroad cars on the spur track to and from the loading 
platform to the south thereof and over said platform 
to and from the warehouses abutting the same on the 
south, and likewise merchandise has been and still is 
being loaded to and from wagons and trucks to the north 
,of tJhe spur track to and from ·s1aid loading platform, 
and over the same to and from said warehouses, and a 
like use has been and still is being made of the loading 
platforms at the west edge thereof where the concrete 
platform and ramp is now located, and virtually the 
whole of said South 1f2 ,of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property) to 
the west of the Globe Mills building has throughout tihe 
years and down to and including the present time been 
used and is being used to drive w1agons and trucks over 
a1nd upon, to ;serve the warehouses ~on Lot 2, through and 
over said loading platform as it was acquired and de-
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signed by the Bailey brothers to do (A b. 90, 94, 96, 109-
110). 
4. In the year 1923, and while their properties were 
being so used, the Bailey brothers commenced severing 
their ownership of the several pr,operties, and at that 
time Bert N. Bailey .sold ·and 'conveyed to his brother, 
defendant, Seymour N. Bailey, his ·one-half interest in 
what is now the Summerhays ibuilding or property (sub-
ject to certain indebtedness) in exchange for defendant, 
Seymour Bailey's one-half interest in the Bouth lf2 of Lot 
3 (plaintiff's property)-tJhe ,Summer hays property (with 
other ·property) at the direction of Seymour Bailey, being 
·conveyed by himself and his wife, and his said brother, 
Bert N. Bailey and his wife, to the Bailey Company, de-
endant, Bailey & >Sons Company, ,and whi~h ·said deed is 
the ,o,ne dated August 9, 19•23, mentioned and referred to 
at the beginning of this Statement of Facts, and grants 
and conveys the easements, rights of way and the right 
to maintain an.d use, rebuild and repair the facilities on 
the South 1/2 of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property) in the lan-
guage hereinbefore set out; and in the deed to Bert N. 
Bailey of defendant, Seymour N. Bailey's, ,one-half in~ 
terest in the South lf2 of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property), so 
given in exchange for the above mentioned deed to Bailey 
& Sons Company, and which is tlhe second deed at the 
commencement ,of this Statement of Facts mentioned and 
referred to, the·se ea-sements, rights and privilege.s were 
reserved to and for the use of Lot 2, in the language 
secondly hereinbefore ·set out. 
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5. Later, Seymour N. Bailey's one-half interest in 
the N orwestern Hide Company property (old Cudahy 
building) was conveyed to the present owner, Colorado 
Animal By-Products Company, with Bert N. Bailey, or 
his estate, retaining and continuing to own his one-half 
interest therein (now owned by Bert Bailey's son, de-
fendant Robert Bailey Whitehill), and the old Scowcroft 
building property was sold to the present owner, Scow-
croft Company, with the deeds of c·onveyance in each 
instance granting and conveying the same easements, 
rights of way and privileges that had been granted and 
reserved in the above mentioned deeds between Bert and 
Seymour Bailey (Exhibit "X", No. 88). At the time 
of all of these conveyances and down to the time of his 
death, Bert N. Bailey (one of plaintiff's predece·ssors 
in interest) himself owned property in Lot 2, which was 
served by the south 1f2 of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property), 
and the facilities thereon-the property so owned by 
Bert Bailey in 1923, when and after he became the sole· 
owner of said South :Y2 ·of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property) 
under the deeds of conveyance between the Bailey broth-
ers above referred to, consisting of an undivided one-half 
interest in the old Scowcroft building property and a 
like interest in the Seymour N. Bailey building and the 
Northwestern Hide & Fur Company building, which two 
last mentioned properties he continued to own to the 
time of his death, and the same is now, as above noted, 
owned by his heir and son, the defendant, Robert Bailey 
Whitehill. 
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6. In August 1928 when plaintiff acquired title to 
the South :y2 of Lot 3, as a mesne successor in interest 
of Bert N. Bailey and his brother, the defendant, Sey-
mour N. Bailey, the easements, rights of way, loading 
platforms and other facilities above mentioned were 
open, visible and apparent thereon, and in open and con-
tinuous use by the defendants or their predecess·ors in 
interest just as they had been for more than twenty 
years, and the deeds above mentioned, wiherein the ease-
ments, rights and privileges were granted and reserved, 
were properly of record in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, and the deed of 
the .property to plaintiff expressly referred to these 
easements and rights of way, and made· the conveyance 
subject thereto in the language thirdly set out at the 
beginning of this Statement of Facts. 
7. About May or June of 1932, the defendants, or 
some ·of them, replaced a portion of the old lumber load-
ing platform on the south line of plaintiff's property 
and adjoining the Northwestern Hide & Fur Company 
building, with a concrete loading platform or ramp, and 
paved with ·concrete the area from the foot of this ramp 
to the west line of plaintiff's property, and also an area 
of some 6 or 7 feet in width between such west line and 
the city sidewalk. 
8. Prior to the construction of this concrete ramp, 
the area s·outh of the spur track was not surfaced in any 
way, and in wet weather the ground became muddy and 
soggy, resulting in a virtual mud hole, making it ex-
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tremely difficult to drive trucks and wagons over it in 
approaching and backing up to the loading platforms, 
and necessitating frequent dumping of cinders in the 
area to fill up the mud holes and make it passable (Ab. 
99, 1~1). S01ne idea of the condition of this area prior 
to the laying of the .concrete may be gained from an 
inspection of the photograph, Exhibit 1, showing an 
area in the region of the city sidewalk and west thereof 
where the unsurfaced ground has been cut up by trucks 
and wagons, and even in dry weather still has a small 
pool of water standing on the ground. 
As previously noted, all of the foregoing facts are 
either admitted by the pleadings or stand uncontroverted 
in the record, and the only dispute in the testimony re-
lates to the width at its western extremity ,o.f the portion 
of the old wooden platform that was replaced by the 
present concrete platform and ramp, and as to whether, 
in laying such concrete, the defendants covered more 
area than was covered by the portion of the old wooden 
platforn1 so replaced by such concrete, but as the trial 
court's findings and decree, in excluding defendants from 
all of plaintiff's property north of the spur track, as 
well as some south thereof, is against law under and 
does violence to the admitted facts in the case, from 
which it appears that by the reservations and grants 
above set out, as well as the use made of plaintiff's 
property for more than thirty years, and the interpre-
tation thereby placed upon such grants and reservations, 
defendants have, and are, as a matter of law, entitled 
t·o easements and rights of way over portions of plain-
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tiff's land from which they are excluded by the decree; 
and as they had, as a matter of law, the right to surface 
the area over which they had such rights of way, includ-
ing that south of the railroad spur, and to rebuild their 
loading platforms thereon, the above mentioned dispute 
in the testimony is of little, if any, importance upon this 
appeal, and will be considered only in relation to plain-
tiff's claim that the burden upon his property has been 
unreasonably increased by the surfacing of the portion 
now covered by the concrete. 
Upon the facts above detailed, the trial court ordered 
"that plaintiff have judgment against the defendants in 
accordance with the prayer of the complaint" (Ab. 139), 
which, as previously noted, prayed that plaintiff's title 
be quieted against all claims of defendants, and that 
defendants be restrained from using plaintiff's land, 
or any part thereof, for any purpose whatsoever (Ab. 
4); but not even counsel for plaintiff had the temerity 
to pr,opose such a decree in view of the evidence in the 
case, and a decree of counsel's making was, therefore, 
entered, which is contrary to the record and the evidence, 
and in violation and disregard of the express terms of 
the grants and reservations above set out, excludes de-
fendants from the use of the team track or auto drive 
and property to the north of the spur track, and limits 
defendants' rights in plaintiff's property to the main-
tenance of a platform over a small portion of the prop-
erty to the g,outh of the spur track, to review which 
judgment or decree, and the actions of the trial court 
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leading- up to the entry thereof, this appeal has been 
perfected. 
~TATE:JlEXT OF ERRORS, QUESTIONS FOR 
DETERMIXATIOX AND BRIEF OF 
THE .A.RGU:JIENT. 
~\s previously pointed out, plaintiff brought his 
action to quiet title to his land, alleging that defendants 
had no interest in or easements over ·or upon the same, 
or any part thereof. In reply to defendants' answers, 
setting up their easements and rights of way and other 
rights and privileges over and in and concerning his 
property, plaintiff admitted the terms of the grants and 
reservations creating such easements and rights, and 
that defendants had the easements and rights alleged 
by them, but charged that defendants had exceeded their 
rights in paving some of the area in question and cover-
ing with a concrete platform and ramp more area than 
had been covered by the portion of the wooden platform 
which the same replaced ; and the case was there by at-
tempted to be converted from a suit to quiet title into 
one to determine the extent of easements and rights 
admittedly possessed by defendants, contrary to the 
alleg-ations of the complaint; and the case was thus tried 
and required to be tried upon issues framed by defend-
antf'' answers and plaintiff's replies, and the allegations 
thereof, and not in anywise by plaintiff's complaint. 
Because of this exceedingly unusual procedure and 
because the trial court, in undertaking to decide upon 
the issues so framed, in his findings ·of Fact, Conclu-
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sions and Decree entirely departed from and found con-
trary to the admitted facts in the case, even to the extent 
of striking certain language from the reservations con-
tained in one of the deeds in que-stion (Ex. "X", No. 23) 
when incorporating such language in his Findings of 
Fact (F. of F. 2, Ab. 14-omits the words "and to the 
premises'' after the word "premises" in line 3 thereof), 
and incorporating in his Findings and Decree metes and 
bounds figures and dimensions of which there is abso-
lutely no evidence in the record, as well as in other 
respects, the defendants have necessarily assigned quite 
a large number ·of errors, many of which while addressed 
to separate findings of fact or conclusions of law or to 
the decree itself, relate to and cover the same general 
proposition or propositions, and theref·ore can well and 
will he grouped together for consideration herein under 
the following heads or propositions comprising our 
Statement of Errors relied upon, Questions for Deter-
mination and Brief of the Argument: 
PoiNT A. The Court erred in denying defendant's 
motion for a judgment on plaintiff's eo·mplaint. 
POINT B. The Court erred in its findings, conclu-
sions and decree in excluding defendants from use of the 
team track or auto drive and property north of the 
spur track, and in limiting defendants' use of and ease-
ments over plaintiff's property to a portion only of the 
property south of the spur track, and the maintenance 
of a small platform thereon; and the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and decree, in so excluding defendants 
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and limiting their use of plaintiff's property, are each 
contrary to and not supported by the evidence and are 
each against law. (Ass. of Error Nos. 2 to 10, both incl.). 
PoiNT C. The Court erred in its findings, conclu-
sions and decree in ordering and requiring removal of 
the present concrete loading platform and ramp, and in 
limiting the platform which may be maintained by 
defendants t·o a platform of the dimensions set forth in 
the findings and decree herein; and the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and decree, in so requiring and limit-
ing defendants, and in so specifying the size of such 
platform, are contrary to and not supported by the 
evidence and are against law. (Ass. of Error, Nos. 4, 5, 
6, 7, Abs. 185, 186, 187). 
PorNT D. The Court erred in disregarding and 
failing to rule upon and in signing the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law without ruling upon, and without 
affording defendants an opportu~ity to be heard upon 
their objections and .proposed amendments to the find-
ings ·of fact, conclusions of law and decree as proposed 
by plaintiff, and thereafter signed by the court. (Ab. 
161-69; Ass. of Error 31). 
PoiNT E. The Court erred in admitting in evidence, 
over defendants' objection, and in overruling defend-
ants' objections to each of plaintiff's Exhibits "L", 
"M'' "N" "0" "P" "Q'' and ''R'' and in using 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
and considering said exhibits as evidence in the case and 
basing the findings and decree herein in part upon the 
same; and the Court also erred in finding and embody-
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ing in the findings, conclusions and decree herein de-
scriptions (by metes and bounds) of portions of plain-
tiff's property of which there is no evidence in the case, 
and which were apparently supplied de hors the record. 
(Ass. of Error Nos. 20 to 30, both incl.). 
POINT F. The Court ',s decree is erroneous, con-
trary to law and not supported by the evidence or the 
findings of fact, and should be reversed (Ass. of Error 
Nos. 11 to 17, both incl.). 
Before proceeding to a discussion of our several 
propositions, it may be helpful to the Court to briefly 
point out and state our complaints of the Court's sev-
eral findings and conclusions concerning which error 
is assigned, and such complaints may be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Finding of Fact No. 3 is not supported by the 
evidence, but is contrary thereto. 
2. Finding of Fact No. 11 is contrary to the evi-
dence and false to the record in that there has been 
omitted from the recital of the reservation in the deed 
therein referred to, the words ''and to the premises'' 
which follow the word ''premises'' in the third line of 
the second paragraph of such reservation, and by such 
omission, the Court has attempted to relieve plaintiff's 
property of a portion of the burden imposed thereon by 
such reservation, in violation and disregard of the 
express terms thereof (see Entry 23 of Abst., Ex. X). 
3. Finding of Fact No. 12 is contrary to the evi-
dence in that it ·omits from the grant in the deed therein 
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referred to certain terms thereof specifying the purpose 
of the grant. (See .Ass. of Error No. 33; Ex. X, No. 26). 
4. Finding of Fact No. 13 is contrary to and not 
supported by the evidence in that there is no evidence 
that at the time found, or at any ·other time, there was 
a platform of the dimensions therein recited, or that 
the roof therein referred to was of the dimensions there-
in found and recited, and the said dimensions and metes 
and bounds description in said Finding contained were 
apparently supplied de hors the reeord. 
5. Finding of Fact No. 14 is not supported by the 
evidence in that there is no evidence whatsoever that 
defendants claim the right to exclude plaintiff from 
the use of that portion of his property covered by said 
concrete ramp, or that the oonstruction, maintenance or 
use of said ramp has increased the burden upon plain-
tiff's property, or that the same is wrongful or dam-
aging to plaintiff or his property beyond what follows 
and is contemplated by the rights granted and reserved 
in and concerning said property f,or the benefit of de-
fendants' property. 
6. Findings of Fact Nos. 15 and 16 are each con-
trary to and not supported by the evidence in that there 
is no evidence that defendants' right to maintain a load-
ing platform or a roof over the same upon plaintiff's 
property is limited to a platform or a roof of the dimen-
sions in said findings set forth, and the dimensions there-
in set forth were apparently supplied de hors the reeord. 
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7. Finding of Fact No. 18 is contrary to and not 
supported by the ·evidence, false to the record and at 
variance and in conflict with Finding of Fact No. 12 
and the grants and reservations of defendants' ease-
Inents over and rights in plaintiff's property therein and 
in the deeds, and in Findings ·of Fact Nos. 11 and 12, 
contained, in that by said grants and reservations there 
was granted and reserved for the benefit of defendants' 
property a perpetual right to ''the use of the railroad 
spur, together with the team, truck and auto drive along 
the north line thereof,'' (A b. 148, last paragraph of 
reservation), and there was also reserved a perpetual 
right to the use ·of the trackage and ''to the premises'' 
(referring to plaintiff's land), notwithstanding which, 
and contrary thereto, the Court finds and adjudges, in 
and by said finding, that defendants have no easements 
over or rights in any of plaintiff's property north of 
the spur track, or except to maintain a platform over a 
small portion of tJhe ground south of the spur track. 
8. The conclusions of law and decree are false to 
the record, and neither find support in the evidence or 
in the findings, in that they likewise exclude defendants 
from use of the team track or auto drive and property 
north of the spur track, and limit defendants' rights in 
plaintiff's property to a small area south ·of the spur 
track, and the maintenance of a small loading platform 
over the same, contrary to and in disregard of the ex-
press terms of the grants and reservations which are in 
part set out and in part falsely omitted from the Find-
ings of Fact; and the Decree, in ordering and requiring 
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the removal of the concrete loading platfor1n and ramp 
presently upon plaintiff's property, is against law and 
finds no support either in the evidence or the findings of 
fact. 
Coming now to a consideration of our several propo-
sitions aboYe enumerated. 
POINT A. As previously pointed out, plaintiff in 
his complaint alleged that he and his predecessors in 
interest haYe been in open, notorious, continuous and 
adverse possession of the real estate therein described 
for more than seven years with hostility toward the 
claims of all other persons, and that plaintiff's pos-
session has been exclusive except for wrongful tres-
passes and encroachments hy defendants, and he further 
alleged that defendants claim the right to use a portion 
of his real estate for roadway purposes and loading 
and unloading of merchandise from and upon railroad 
cars and trucks which pass over and upon plaintiff's 
land, and to maintain and use a ramp and loading 
platform thereon, and that they are making constant 
use of the same, and that such use is wrongful and in 
violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and he prayed 
that his title be quieted against all such claims of defend-
ants, and that they be restrained and enj,oined from 
using his property, or any portion thereof, for any 
purpose whatsoever. In his reply, however, plaintiff 
said that the allegations of his complaint above referred 
to were false and untrue in that he admitted that defend-
ants had and were entitled to certain easements and 
rights of way over and ,other rights in and concerning 
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his property, and he specifically admitted that in and 
by the deeds alleged in defendants' answers, by and 
between the common grantors of the parties, grants or 
reservations of easements and rights in his property 
were contained, as alleged by defendants. 
Ignoring the bad faith evident in this type of plead-
ing, the effect thereof was to convert the action from one 
to quiet plaintiff's title against allegedly unfounded 
claims of defendants, into an action to construe the 
grants and reservations contained in the Bailey brothers 
deeds, and to determine the extent of defendants' ad-
mitted easements over and rights in plaintiff's property, 
which plaintiff claimed and asserted were not as great 
or extensive as asserted by defendants. Plaintiff's com-
plaint thus went entirely out of the lawsuit, and the 
ease was presented for trial upon the allegations of de-
fendants' answers and the plaintiff's replies thereto. 
This Court has several times held, as have the 
courts generally, that the character of a lawsuit may 
not be thus changed or a new and different cause of 
action and prayer or claim for relief thus introduced into 
the 0a.se. Combined Metals v. Bastia~Jz, 71 Utah 535; 
Idaho Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Robinson, 54 Utah 481; 
Straw v. Temple, 48 Utah 258; Fields v. Cobbey, 22 
Utah 415; .Weber v. Wannamaker, (Colo.) 89 Pac. 780~ 
Clernmons v. McGreer, (vVash.) 115 Pac. 1081. 
Ordinarily, a suit to quiet title or to remove a cloud 
on title may not be employed to obtain the Court's con-
struction of a deed or other instrument under which the 
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parties claim. Trustees of School v. lVilson, (Ill.) 166 
X. E. 33, IS A. L. R. ~2, and note 78 A. L. R. 44. 
In his eon1plaint, plaintiff asserted that defendants 
had no interest in or easement over his land, and prayed 
that the eourt so adjudge, and by its decree enjoin 
defendants from ''taking possession of or using all or 
any port ton of plaintiff's real estate for any purpose 
whatsoeYer. '' By his replies, plaintiff admitted and 
alleged that defendants did have some rights in and ease-
ments oYer his land, and that he, therefore, was not 
entitled to the relief prayed in his complaint. There 
was not even any prayer, either in the con1plaint or in 
plaintiff's replies, which authorized the proceedings had 
or the judgment or decree entered in the case, but the 
Court, nevertheless, and notwithstanding defendants' 
motion, proceeded to hear and determine, not the case 
made by plaintiff's complaint, but a case purporting 
to be n1ade by defendants' answers and plaintiff's replies 
thereto which "·as and is an entirely different case from 
that attempted to be made by the complaint. It is sub-
mitted that defendants' motion was well taken and that 
the Court erred in denying the same and refusing to 
dismiss plaintiff's complaint, and in proceeding to hear 
the ease so purporting to have been made upon defend-
ants' answers and plaintiff's replies thereto. 
POINT B. As previously pointed out, all parties to 
this action, so far as the property involved on this 
appeal is concerned, claim through the same or common 
owners and grantors, namely, defendants Seymour N. 
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Bailey and his deceased brother, Bert N. Bailey, who 
were the owners as tenants in common of plaintiff's land 
as well as that of all of the appealing defendants. Such 
joint ownership .of plaintiff's land, as well as the major 
part of the lands in Lot 2 here involved, was severed in 
1923, by the conveyance to Bert of defendants, Seymour 
Bailey's, one-half interest in what is now plaintiff's 
property, and the conveyance to the defendant, Bailey 
& Sons Company, by Bert and Seymour Bailey and their 
wives of said defendants' lands in Lot 2, by the deeds of 
conveyance dated August 9, 1923, which are found and 
described in Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 12, and the 
rights in and easements over what is now plaintiff's 
land were therein granted and reserved; and as all of 
the parties claim under and through these deeds it is 
obvious that they are bound and their rights are deter-
mined by the de-eds, and the grants and reservations 
therein contained, and they can neither detract from nor 
add to the rights therein granted and reserved. 
Aside from the rights granted and reserved to main-
tain loading platforms and a roof over the same, and to 
rebuild and reconstruct such platforms, which we will. 
consider under Point C, the deeds above referred to 
(Finding No. 11) reserve ''the perpetual right to the 
use of the trackage aJong the s·outh line of said premises 
a;nd to the premises, and to the team, truck or auto drive 
along the said track, all to be used in connection and for 
the convenience of Lot 2 of ·said block for the loading and 
unloading of merchandise" (Entry No. 23, Ex. X). It 
will be observed that the words "and to the premises" 
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are omitted froin the Finding as copied in the abstract 
of the record for the reason that said words were strick-
en from the reservation as set forth in said Finding. 
If the Court will look at Finding No. 11 of the original 
Findings, however, (Tr. 120) it will be observed that 
said words were properly inserted and then stricken with 
pen and ink. 
The above quoted reservation plainly and in unmis-
takable terms reserves, in addition to the trackage, the 
right to the use of the premises, which plainly means the 
premises being granted, namely, the South half of Lot 
3 (plaintiff's property); and it also specifically reserves 
the right to the use of the team, truck or auto drive 
along the spur track, and all this ''to be used in con-
nection and for the convenience of Lot 2 etc.'' 
The deed from the Bailey brothers and their wives 
to Bailey & Sons Company ('F. of F. No. 12) also con-
tains an express, grant of ''the perpetual right to the 
use of the railroad spur, together with the team, truck 
and auto drive along the north line thereof etc.,'' and 
hence, there is by these deeds unmistakably and plainly 
reserved and granted a perpetual right to the use of 
plaintiff's premises· north as well as south of the rail-
road spur track, including and specially referred to and 
granted, the team, truck or auto drive along the north 
line of the spur track. In this connection, it might be 
noted that this team or auto drive was constructed on 
the north side of the spur track and paved with concrete 
prior to 1914, and it has existed and been used ever 
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since down to and including the present, for the loading 
and unloading of merchandise on the north side of the 
spur track to and from box cars thereon, and also to and 
from the loading platforms on the south side of the 
spur (Ah. 90, 95). The pavement is now pretty well 
worn and covered with gravel, but may still plainly be 
seen on the ground, and it plainly a ppean:; in the 
photograph, Exhibit 4. 
Notwithstanding these express and plain grants 
and reservations, the trial court, by its Findings and 
De-cree appealed fron1, excludes defendants from and 
finds and adjudges that defendants have no easements 
or rights of way over any part of plaintiff's property 
~1Jorth of the spur track. 
The language in these grants and reservations is 
plain and unan1biguous, and neither requires nor is sub-
ject to any construction, but if they are to be in anywise 
construed, it devolves upon the Court to look to the situa-
tion of the parties, the object to he attained and the 
circumstances generally surrounding and attending the 
transaction when the instruments granting and reserving 
the easements and rights of way were made. 
As ·said by this Court in Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 
81 Utah 355, quoting with approval from other cases 
(page 360): 
"in construing instruments creating easements 
in land, the court will look to the circumstances 
attending the transaction, the situation of the 
parties, the state of the thing gran ted, and the 
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object to be attained, to ascertain and give effect 
to the intention of the parties.'' 
It should also be ren1embered that the easements 
here in question are '·easements appurtenant' '-they 
are attached to and for the benefit ,of the lands in Lot 2, 
in which both grantors in such deeds had, and continued 
to have, property to which such easements and rights 
were necessary and convenient; Ernst v. Allen, et al.; 
Allen et al. v. Langford, 55 Utah 272; and this being an 
equitable action, it i:S not only the right but the duty 
of this Court to review, weigh and consider the evidence 
and determine questions of fact as well as of law. Jensen 
v. Birch Creek Ranch Co., 76 Utah 356-362; Leland 
v. Bourne, 41 Utah 125, 137. 
\\Then the grants and reservations in the deeds, and 
the admitted facts and uncontroverted evidence in the 
case, are looked to with the above stated cardinal rule 
of construction in mind, it is too plain to admit of dispute 
that such grants and reservations created, granted and 
reserved easements and rights of way ·over plaintiff's 
land to the north as well as to the south of the railroad 
spur track-it was plainly contemplated by the Bailey 
brothers when they made these deeds, and the grants 
and reservations therein, that plaintiff's property even 
to the whole thereof west of the Globe Mills Building, if 
required, should be used as a driveway and turn-ar·ound 
''for the convenience of Lot 2 of said Block, for the 
loading and unloading of merchandise,'' as specifically 
stated in the deeds. 
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As previously noted, plaintiff's property had been 
so used for more than thirty years by the ·owners of 
the several properties in Lot 2. To facilitate this use, 
a paved driveway (team, truck or auto drive) was con-
structed on the north side of the spur track, and all of 
the area in front of the Globe Mills Building was paved 
as a turn-around f.or wagons and trucks, and it has 
been through tJhe years, and still is, ·so used. (See map, 
Ex. 7, and testimony of Ryser, Richards and Jensen, 
.Ab. 90, 95, 105, 109, 110, 120-122). Plaintiff's own wit-
nesses, Evans and Snow, employees of Kelly-Springfield 
Tire Co., which occupied the Northwestern Hide & Fur 
Co. Building from about 1926 to 1931, testified to a 
similar use ·of the .property by that company and others 
dealing with it (Ab. 128-130, 134). 
This use of the property, and the easements and 
rights of way, were open, visible and apparent, and in 
constant use at the time plaintiff bought his property. 
He so admits in his reply (Ab. 56-75), and he further 
admitted on the witness stand that he had inspected the 
property before he bought it. (Ab. 86). In view thereof, 
plaintiff was charged with notice and knowledge of these 
easements and the extent thereof, and the extent of 
defendants' claims thereunder and the full use of the 
property which was being made at the time he purchased 
the same. R.ollo v. Nelson, 34 Utah 116. 
It is also significant that for more than ten years 
after he acquired the property, plaintiff stood by and 
observed the use made of the same under these ease-
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without protest ·or complaint of any kind, and he and 
his property are, therefore, not only bound by the ease-
ments and right of way as expressed in the language 
in which the same are granted and reserved in the deeds 
in question, but also with the construction which had 
been placed upon the same by the use made and being 
made of the property both before and after he acquired 
it. Rollo t\ }.;r elson, supra. 
Contrary to the admitted facts and the express 
terms of the grants and reservations in the deeds, as 
well as the construction which had been placed upon the 
same by many years of use of the property, the trial 
court found that defendants had no easements or rights 
of \Yay over or other rights in the team, truck or auto 
drive, and property north of the spur track, and by the 
decree appealed from excluded defendants from all of 
such property. Thus, and contrary to the uncontroverted 
facts and evidence in the case, the Court found in Find-
ing X o. 3 that plaintiff and his predecessors in interest 
have been in exclusive and adverse possession of his 
real estate for more than seven years, except for wrong-
ful encroachments by defendants, and the Court also, 
in Finding No. 18 found that defendants have no ease-
ment or right of way except as found in certain ·of the 
other findings which relate to the property south of 
the spur track, and found that defendants have merely 
a right to maintain a sn1allloading platform on a portion 
nf said property. Such Findings and Decree, we sub-
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mit, are plainly C·ontrary to the evidence and against 
law and ought not to be permitted to stand. 
PorNT C. \Yith respect to that portion of plaintiff's 
property south of the spur track, which is now paved 
with concrete and contains the concrete platforn1 and 
ran1p complained ·of, the evidence is likewise undisputed 
that under the grants and reservations in the deeds, 
as \Yell as by continued use, and the construction thereby 
placed upon such grants and reservations, defendants 
have and are entitled to easements and rights of way 
over the whole of such property so south of the spur 
track. The trial court in its Findings and Decree rec-
ognized and decreed such right over a portion of such 
land in connection with his decree of the right of defend-
ants to maintain a platfor1n over a portion of said 
ground (Ab. 149-53). The evidence shows that for more 
than thirty years, tean1s, and later trucks, have been 
driven over this area and backed up from the west to 
and against the westerly edge ·of the loading platform 
·which existed at the rear of the Northwestern Hide & 
Fur Company building before the present ramp and 
platform was constructed, as well as from the north to 
and against the northerly edge thereof, using and tra-
Yersing every inch of the ground no\v covered by such 
concrete platforn1 and ramp, ·of which plaintiff com-
plains ; and this ground is being used today in just the 
~ame manner as it has been used throughout the years, 
except that instead of backing up over a piece of flat 
unsurfaced terrain which was a virtual 1nud hole in wet 
weather, to a perpendicular edge of a loading platform, 
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the tnwks now back over concrete and up a slight incline 
cr grade to the loading· platfonn itself, which is now 
somewhat lower than the portion thereof which was 
removed when the concrete was laid, and this concrete 
ramp and platform cover the identical land which was 
so used and traversed by teams, wagons and trucks in 
backing up to the old wooden platform which it replaced. 
The witnesses, Ryser, Richards and Jensen, each testi-
fied to this use for twenty-five years or more (Ah. 
94-110-120-22), and the plaintiff's own witnesses, Evans 
and Snow, confirmed this use of the property from 
about 19:26 to 19131 (Ab. 130-34), and there is no testi-
mony whatever to the contrary, and as previously noted, 
the trial court in its Findings and Decree has so found 
and recognized su{'h easmnents and rights of way in part. 
By the terms of the grants and reservations, the 
owners of the lands in Lot 2, admittedly have the right 
to maintain a loading platform or platform·s on the .goutih'" 
ern portion ;Of p1aintiff's property, with the "full right 
to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the ·Same within its pre-
sent location." (Ex. X, :23 and 25, F. of F. Nos. 11 and 
12). 
There is some dispute in the testimony concerning 
the .size of the portion of the old platform which was 
replaced h,v the concrete, but irrespective of such dis-
l'Pte in the testimony, and irrespective and regardless 
of the size ·of such platform, which we will !hereinafter 
consider, the defendants under said grants and reserva-
tions unquestionably have the right to maintain, and they 
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had the right to build or construct a platform on this 
portion of plaintiff's property of some dimensions; 
and further and more important upon this appeal, the 
defendants have and are entitled to easements and rights 
of way over plaintiff's ground, and the whole thereof 
south of the spur track, to reach and drive wagons and 
other 'conveyances over and upon in re,aching and back-
ing up to any such loading platform. What defendants 
did in tearing down a portion of the old platform and 
replacing the same with concrete had to do more with 
their easements and rights of way over the ground, than 
it did with the rebuilding or reconstructing of the por-
tion ·of the platform so removed. What defendants 
actually did was to remove a portion of the old wooden 
platform and surface with concrete the area over which 
they so had their easements and rights of way, including 
the area previously covered by such old platf.orm, 
slightly changing the grade of a portion of their rights 
of way .so that the right of way, in addition to being 
surfaced with concrete now slopes up ramplike to the 
remaining portion of the old platform, but as previously 
noted, the cement and ramp covers the identical area 
over which defendants have such easements, and over 
which teams and trucks would have to back to reach any 
loading platform upon this portion of plaintiff's prop-
erty, whether constructed as such platform was origin-
ally or as the same is now. In other words, defendants, 
in laying such concrete, merely surfaced their right of 
way and slightly changed the grade thereof so as to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
make their easements and rights of way serviceable and 
more convenient for their use in the manner intended. 
Having the easements and rights of way over and 
up·on the ground now covered by the concrete and ramp, 
defendants had, as a matter of law, the rigiht to surface 
their easements and rights of way to make the same 
passable and more convenient for their use, including 
the right to change the grade of such easements or rights 
of "\Yay so long as in doing so they did not unreasonably 
interfere with s·ome use plaintiff was entitled to make 
of this portion of his property, i. e., so long as they did 
not increase the burden or servitude upon plaintiff's 
land. 
The rule respecting the right of the owner of an 
easement or right of way to maintain, repair, surface 
and otherwise change and impr·ove the same is well 
stated in American Jurisprudence, Vol. 17, page 1005, 
Sec. 111, in this language : 
''Generally, the grantor ·Of an easement con-
sisting of a way in the absence of any express 
stipulation is under no obligation to maintain the 
way in a condition .suitable for use; maintenance 
of the way is left to the grantee. The latter may 
make the way as useable as possible for the pur-
pose of the right ·owned so long as he does not 
increas-e the burden on the servient tenement or 
unreasonably interfere with the rights of the 
owner thereof. The right of the owner of an 
easement of way to make repairs exists without 
question where the way is impassable and useless 
without repairs. It has been held that the grantee 
of an easement may prepare the way f.or proper 
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use and, hence, may grade, gravel, plough or 
pave su.ch way. I-Ie may depress the grad~ of. the 
way so as to make it accessible to a pubhc hi~h­
way with which it connects. There IS authonty 
for the proposition tha~ the owner of a;n ease~ent 
of way may improve It by constructing a side-
walk but he can do nothing in any respect which tend~ to place an additional burden upon the 
servient premises or interferes with the rights of 
other persons having a right to use the way. The 
reasonableness of the improvements or repairs 
made by the owner of an easement of way is 
largely a question of fact.'' 
Section 112, page 1006: 
''The test to determine the right to n1ake a 
particular alteration is whether the alteration is 
so substantial as to result in the creation and 
substitution of a different servitude from that 
which previously existed.'' 
In Doan v. Allgood, (Ill. 1923) 141 N. E. 779, the 
Court laid down the rule in this language : 
"Whoever has an easement in or over the 
land ·Of another has the right to do everything 
necessary to preserve the easement, and the right 
to repair a way is fully established. * * * The 
question of what acts of repair are reasonable in 
the use and enjoyment of an easement is one of 
fact in each particular case, and depends on the 
extent and character of the lawful use of the 
easement. The owner of the easement may make 
such grades or fills and lay such tiles or construct 
such ditches as may be necessary to enable him 
to make use of the way in accordance with the 
grant, provided in so doing he does not injure 
the servient estate. He may not construct a grade 
or fill or ditch in such a manner as to affeet 
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injuriously the adj·oining· land of the servient 
estate.'' 
And in i.llissio11ary Soc. v. Evrotas, (N.Y.) 175 N. E. 
3~~. the rights of the owner of an easement or rights 
of way are thus stated: 
'' EYen if defendant's easement were to be 
constructed as no broader than a right of passage, 
he would be entitled to break up the soil, level 
irregularities, fill up depressions, blast rocks, and 
not only ren1ove impediments but supply defi-
ciencies in order to construct a suitable road. 
* * * In so far as such operations would not 
interfere with the rights of the other abutting 
owners, his actions would not proceed beyond the 
intent of the grant. His right to use the land 
f.or the passage of vehicles cannot be regarded 
as free and unobstructed, if he be obliged to 
refrain from putting it in a reasonably convenient 
condition for such a use.'' 
To like effect, and establishing the right of an 
owner of an easement or right of way to change the 
grade of the way, pave or otherwise surface it, and 
make and maintain the same in a condition for his con-
venient use, see Guillet v. Livernois, (Mass.) 8 K. E. 
(2d) 921; Brown v. Stone, (Mass.) 10 Gray 61, 69 Am. 
Dec. 303; Atkins v. Bordman, (Mass.) 2 Met. 457, 37 
Am. Dec. 100; J( aatz v. Curtis, (Mass.) 102 N. E. 424; 
Do an l\ Allgood, supra; Heuer v .. Webster, 187 Ill. App. 
273; Hernt-an v. Roberts, (N.Y.) 23 N. E. 442, 7 L. R. A. 
226, 16 Am. St. Rep. 801; Bina v. Bina, (Ia.) 239 N. W. 
68, 78 A. L. R. 1216; Newcomen v. Coulson, (Eng.) 
L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 133 C. A.; Central Christian Church v. 
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Lennon, (Wash.) 109 Pac. 1027; Smith v. Rome, 19 Ga. 
89, 63 Am. Dec. 298; and Freeman v. Sayre, 48 N. J. L. 
37, 2 Atl. 650. 
Under the authorities above cited, defendants had 
the right to do exactly what they did respecting their 
easements and rights of way, unless in so doing they 
unreasonably interfered with some right ·of plaintiff, i.e., 
unless they increased the burden or servitude upon his 
property, and the only question in this connection then 
is as to whether in so cen1enting the ground over which 
they had their easements and rights of way, defendants 
did increase the burden or servitude upon plaintiff's 
land. 
By way of C·onclusion merely, the trial court finds 
that the burden upon plaintiff's property was increased 
(F. of F. 14), but no fact or facts whatever are found 
supporting this ·Conclusion, and when the evidence is 
looked to there is not a scintilla of evidence which could 
be .claimed to even remotely support any such conclusion. 
The onus was on plaintiff to prove his allegation of 
increased burden (Bu.rns v. Williams, (Minn.) 172 N. W. 
772), but he neither produced nor attempted to produce 
any evidence whatsoever upon this point, and the evi-
dence produced generally went to show 0onclusively that 
there was no increase of the burden on plaintiff's prop-
erty by such paving of this area, and the construction of 
the ramp complained of. It was uncontroverted that in 
wet weather the water drained into this area making it a 
virtual mud hole, requiring frequent dumping ·of cinders 
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therein in an atten1pt to fill up the holes (Ab. 121-22), 
which of itself furnished good ground for paving the. 
area and building the ramp to drain off the water and 
keep the area dry and passable, thereby benefiting rather 
than burdening the property. Guillet v. Livernois, 
supra. 
Plaintiff himself could of course do nothing .on this 
property that would interfere with defendants' use there-
of. In view of defendants' easements and rights of way, 
he could not erect any building or obstruction of any 
kind, not even so much as a peanut stand on any portion 
of this ground, because to do so would interfere with 
free access to the ground and the loading platforms 
thereon, irrespective of whether such platforms were 
of the size claimed by plaintiff, or of the size c1aimed 
by defendants, or as now ·constructed in the form of plat-
forms, ramp and paving. Plaintiff can now make every 
use of his property, and every portion thereof, which he 
rould make before the area in question was paved and 
the present ramp constructed. He has not shown, and 
he cannot show that he has in anywise been deprived 
of any use of ·Or any right in his property which he is 
entitled to, by the paving and construction of the ramp 
complained of, and there is, therefore, no support what-
soever for the claim or the trial court's conclusion that 
the burden upon plaintiff's property has been increased 
by the paving thereof. 
If, as we contend, defendants had the right to sur-
face the ground ·covered by tJheir easements and rights of 
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way 1and in do in rr so they did not increase the burden 
• ' 0 
upon plaintiff's land, then the size of the old ,original 
platform, or the portion thereof that was replaced by 
the concrete, and whether the concrete covers more area 
than was covered by :such platform, is immaterial to and 
,of no consequence in this la·wsuit, and tlhe evidence and 
testimony ·Concerning the size of such platform need not 
be reonsidered, 1but as the trial court made findings upon 
this question contrary to the evidence and admitted facts, 
we shall1briefly refer to this matter and the evidence con-
eerning it. 
Upon the trial, it 'Yas contended, and no doubt will 
be in this Court, that the language in the reservation in 
the deed referred to in Finding of Fa.ct No. 11, reserving 
the rig1ht to maintain a platform on the southern portion 
of plaintiff's property "abrout 10 feet wide", and the 
reservation of the right to repair or rebuild such plat-
form ''within its present loeation," fixed and determined 
the size -of the platform which defendants could maintain 
at about 10 feet in width, but while there is some slight 
dispute in the evidence concerning the exact size of tihe 
old pLatform at its westerly edge, the undisputed evi-
dence and the physical fa,cts and circumstances do estab-
lish beyond the per adventure of a doubt that the plat-
form referred to in the deeds, and as it originally existed, 
never was of 1a width of only 10 feet, and that no n1atter 
what its w1dth at its westerly edge (which is tlhe point 
abrout which the testimony differed), the northerly edge 
of the platform did follow the eurve of the spur, and did 
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have a width of ~unw thirty to thirt:·-fin~ feet, and these 
facts were establi:.-:hed by plaintiff's own witnesses, Sno·w 
and E,·ans (Ab. 1:2~, 131, 133-4). 
In 1addition to referring to the platform as ''about 
10 feet wide,'' the reserva ti,on also includes the right to 
maintain an oYerlapping roof for said platform, and fur-
ther deseribes the platfonn as "including also the curve 
thereof ~along the railroad spur.'' Althoug1h this language 
follows the reference to the roof over the platform, it 
obviously refers to the platform itself because the roof 
never did follow the curve of the track, and is a.t present 
in the same condition as when originally constructed, 
that is, straight-edged and not curved (see photos, Ex. 
2, 3 and 5), and in some of the conveyances the roof is 
referred to as being at the north end of the platform, 
which is in acoo~rdance with the facts (Ab. 33). From the 
photographs received in evidence, and the plat, E·xhibit 
7, the Court will note that the spur runs in a general east 
and westerly direction, curving to the north as it ap-
proaches and enters the ·street, which furnishes the curve 
referred to in the reservation, and it is, therefore, ap-
parent from the language of the reservation and the 
physical facts, t\ha.t the words ''about 10 feet wide,'' refer 
to the easterly end of the platform and not the westerly 
end thereof, as plaintiff apparently seeks to interpret it, 
I 
as otherwise the language following such dimensions, 
''including also the curve thereof etc.,'' would be mean-
ingless. In other Wiords, the language in the reservation 
obviously specifies a platform proceeding from a width 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
of "about 10 feet'' at its easterl/y extremity, and running 
west with a .curve to the nor~h. along the ·spur track, which 
very effectively describes a platform ·occupying the area 
between the north wall of the warehouse buildings on 
Lot 2, and the spur track, following with its northerly 
edge the line of the spur as it curves to the north towards 
and into the street, :and this is in accordance wi11h the evi-
dence (Ab. 90, 91, 102-3, 106, 119, 123). It is obvious that 
to be ,of any use as a loading platform to and from box 
cars on the ,spur, the platform would have to follow the 
curve of the ·spur and be constructed within a few feet 
of the track .and this would be particularly true of the 
portion of the plat£orm at and near the westerly end ad-
jacent to the Northwestern Hide & Fur Company build-
ing, ·where the undisputed evidence shows that meat and 
other commodities were loaded to .and from hox .cars on 
the spur, and where a pair -of scales were set into the 
platform at the time this building was occupied by 
Cudahy, and large meat trucks were operated on the plat-
form to lo.ad and unload meat and other commodities 
from the box ·cars over the platform a~nd into the ware-
ihouse building (Ah. 120, 123). Men who had worked over 
this platform for more than twenty-five years testified 
that it was 32 feet wide at its westerly extremity, with 
a j·og to the east of .about 10 feet, and then a. j-og to the 
north to within a few feet of the spur track (Ab. 90-91, 
102-3, 106, 119, 123). The man who removed the plat-
form when it was replaced by the 'concrete, and wlho was 
a thoroughly disinterested witness not employed by any 
of the defendants, testified that he measured the stringers 
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which supported the flooring of the platform at its west-
erly extremity when he removed them, a~nd t!hat they 
measured 32 feet in length. He testified that there were 
two stringers butted end to end and set into the wall of 
the warehouse building at right angles to and running 
north from the building w.all, and that one of such string-
ers so butted end to end was 18 feet and the 1otlher 14 feet 
in length, making the platform at this westerly edge 32 
feet in width (Ab. 103). The platform would have had 
to have been of approximately this size in order to have 
permitted the use which was admittedly made of it, and 
which use, in addition to tlhe pushing of meat trucks and 
the like over it, weighing ,operations and the like, in-
cluded the backi,ng up to the platform at its westerly edge 
of as many as six wagons for loading and unloading pur-
poses (Ab. 94), and the above recited physical facts and 
the language in the reservation itself show the platform 
to have 1been of .appr,oximately this size. 'Even plaintiff's 
O\Yn witnesses, Snow and Evans, admitted that at a point 
a slhort distance east of the we.sterly edge ·of the platform, 
it was at least 25 to 30 feet in width, and that it fol-
lowed the curve of the track (Ab. 128, 131, 133-4). 
From this evidence, ·coupled with the physical fa,cts 
and the language ,of the reservation itself, we submit that 
the only reasonable conclusion deducible is that the old 
platform in its westerly ·course followed the curve of the 
spur to the north and was of the width testifie-d by de-
fendants' witne·sses, namely, about 32 feet at its westerly 
extremity, a,nd "about 10 feet wide" at its easterly ex-
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tremity as recited in the reser~atioon itself. It may b€ 
noted that th~ platform at its easterly extremity is not 
now as much as 10 feet in width, nor is it as wide through-
out what remains of it as when originally constructed, 
for the reason, as shown by the uncontradicted evidence, 
that it was cut off all al,ong its length on the spur track 
side to afford better clearance for tihe cars on the spur 
and the men handling the same (A b. 113, 123). 
In his findi,ngs, however, the trial ·court departed en-
tirely from and completely disregarded the evidenee in 
the case, and by metes and bounds has described a plat-
form set back at its westerly edge 7.3 feet from the prop-
erty line, and which it is recited to be or to have been 10.7 
feet wide at its westerly extremity and for .34 feet east 
thereof, and then jogging out to the north 14.6 feet to a 
total width at that point of 25.3 feet, and then following 
along the track t,o- the east to a width of 5 feet at its east-
erly end (F. of F. No. 13 .and C. of L·. No.2). The Court 
may search the record from end to end and it will not 
find any testimony of any such dimensions, or that the 
platform was ,o.f the size so described in tihe Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree. ·Obviously, these dimensions 
were obtained and made de hors the record by someone 
after the case w.as tried and the 'eourt had announced his 
decision. That this was the .case was virtually admitted 
by -counsel for plaintiff upon the hearing of the motion 
for a new trial (Ab. 177-180). At this time counsel ad-
mitted that .a. survey of the property had been made after 
the court had announced his decision and measurements 
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made to obtain the dimensions used in the Findings and 
Decree. Counsel also elaimed tJha t the s·o-called railroad 
and insurajnce maps (Ex. "L", "M'', "N'', "0", "P'', 
'' Q'' and '' R '') were also used to obtain such dimensions. 
As we shall hereinafter point out, these nl,aps were not 
properly identified or authenticated to be received as 
substantive evidence. There was no evidence that they 
were or pretended t,o be accurate. Tihe makers of the maps 
were not produced and no one competent to speak au-
thenticated them, and the~· were received in evidence by 
the court over defenda,nts' objections as illustra.tive 
merely of the testimony of plaintiff and his witnesses 
(Ab. 84-5-6). Xotwithstanding they were not and could 
not be received .as substantive evidenee, the Court, under 
counsel's own admission, in making his Findings and De-
cree~ has so used the maps and has also used other di-
mensions abtained by ·someone after the trial of the case, 
and which some01le defendants had no ·opportunity to 
cross-examine as to such claimed dimensions and meas-
urements or the making thereof. If such proeedure is to be 
permitted in the trial of cases in a court of justice, we 
might as well flatly alhandon all rule·s of evidence and 
trial procedure and any pretext of a fair and impartial 
determination ,of the rights of litigants. It is submitted 
that the Findings .and Conclusions so made and the De-
cree thereon cannot be permitted to stand. 
The Finding.s, ·Conelusions and Decree herein, at-
tempting to lin1it the· size of the platform defendants are 
entitled to 1naintain on plaintiff's property, are a plain 
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attempt to rewrite the grants and reservations in the 
deeds under which the parties claim and to relieve the 
plaintiff's property of the major portion ·of the burden 
thereby imposed upon the same, and ought not, we sub-
mit, to be permitted to stand. 
POINT D. Within due time and the order of the 
Court (Tr. 103-4) after servi·ce 10f the Findings and De-
cree proposed by plaintiff, and under date of August 7, 
1'939, defendants made objections and proposed proper 
amendments to the Findings, Conclusions and Decree as 
so proposed (Ab. 1'61-68) to make the same conform to 
law and the facts and evidence in the case, but disregard-
ing and without ruling and passing upon or giving de-
fendants any opportunity to be heard upon such objec-
tions and proposed amendments, the trial court under 
date ,of August 14, 1939, .signed and filed Findings and 
De,cree as proposed by plaintiff (Alb. 169). 
While there is apparently no statute expressly pro-
viding for the making of objections and tlhe proposal of 
amendments to Findings and Decree as proposed by the 
prevailing party, the losing party unquesti1ona.bly has 
the inherent right to do so, and to be heard upon the ob-
jections and amendments which he makes and proposes 
and in respect to the settlement of the Findings and De-
cree in the ·case ; and the Tihird District Court has recog-
nized and provided £or the exercise of ·such right by the 
adoption of a rule {13) providing in part that after serv-
ice of a proposed draff of Findings and Decree by the 
prevailing party, ''if adver.se counsel deems the .same in-
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sufficient or not in accordance with the Judge's de1cision, 
he may, within twenty-four hours, or such further time 
as the Judg-e may on application allow, specify his ob-
jections thereto tog-ether with such amendments as he 
may deem proper to make the draft conform to the 
Judge'·s decision, serve a ·copy there,of upon opposing 
counsel, and likewise deliver the original, with proof of 
service to the Judge, or in his absenee, to the Clerk for 
him. The Judge may thereupon designate a time WJhen 
he will settle the same, and at the time so appointed, the 
draft so prepared together with objections and amend-
ments so proposed, will be considered and s-ettled by the 
Judge, etc.'' 
This Court has held that it is error to fail or refuse 
to rule upon a motion to strike, and upon a. motion to 
strike a 'cost bill, as well as to make proper Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree when requested so to do. Petty 
v. St. George Garage Co., 60 Utah 126, 130-131; Open-
shww v. Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 232-3. 
It should require no authority to sustain the pro-
position that a party is entitled to notice of and an op-
portunity to be heard on ,objections made to proposed 
and requested action by the Court in the case, including 
as here notice of and an opportunity to be heard con-
cerning the settlement of Findings, Conclusions and De-
eree in the ·case, where, as 'here, those pr,oposed 1by the 
prevailing party are objected to and amendments there-
to are proposed. Instead of requiring notice of the 
settlement of such Findings and Decree, and affording 
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defendants an opportunity to be heard thereon, and upon 
their objections and proposed amendments, 'the trial 
rcourt erroneously and without any hearing-, and without 
ruling upon such objecti1ons and proposed amendments, 
signed and filed the Findings and Decree as proposed 
by plaintiff, which are, as previously pointed out, not at 
all in a:ceord with the judgment or decree which was 
ordered by the Court upon his consideration :of the case 
(Ab. 139). It is submitted that the Court erred in fail· 
ing and refusing to rule upon defendants' objections and 
proposed amendments, and in signing the Findings and 
Decree without ruling thereon, as well as in failing to 
sustain the .objections made and to allow the amendments 
propos·ed, which were proper and conformed to the law 
and the evidence in the case. 
POINT E. A·s previously pointed out, the trial court, 
over defendants' repeated objetctions, received in evi· 
dence and permitted counsel for plaintiff to examine 
plaintiff and his witnesses, and to cross-examine de-
fendants' witnesses upon Exhibits "L", "M", "N", 
"0'', "P", "Q" and "R", whicih are claimed to be maps 
or drawings of the property and some of the buildings, 
the railroad spur and other improvements upon the pr:op-
erty in question. These maps and drawings were not 
identified or authenticated by the makers thereof, or by 
anyone who knew or pretended to know anything what-
soever about them. X o w·itne.ss authorized to speak 
testified or vouched for their correctness or aceuracy, 
and nothing was shown concerning the purpose for which 
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they "·ere prPpa red or anything- about their preparation. 
It was not even shown that· they 'Zcere or purported to be 
maps or drawings of the property in question except by 
the unfounded and unsupported statements of witnesses, 
who neither knew nor professed to know anytihing about 
the same or their prepara.tion, or for that matter to have 
ever seen the same before they were produced in court, 
to the effect that the property and improvements in ques-
tion looked like what the maps and drawings purported 
to show. 
It is elemental that before a map or drawing may be 
received as substa;ntive a;n.d independent evidence, its 
correctness and accuracy must be proved as a pre-re-
quisite to it·s introduction. Young Mines Co. L'td. v. 
Blackbu,rn, (Ariz.) 196 Pac. 167; Jordarn v. Duke, (Ariz.) 
53 Pac. 197. While maps and drawings in some instances 
may be admitted for illustrative purposes-that is to il-
lustrate a witnesses testimony-without proof of their 
accuracy .or .correctnes•s, they should even in such in-
stances at least be shown to be maps or drawings of the 
property or thing about which the witness is tes,tifying, 
and should not be used or permitted to be used as evi-
dence themselves or as the witnesses' testimony, or in 
substitution f:or the witnesses' testimony. 
The trial court in overruling some of defendants' ob-
jections and admitting tJhese exhibits in evidence, stated 
that he was receiving them as illustrative only of the 
witnesses' testimony (Ab. 85, 86), 1but notwithstanding 
that none of these maps or drawings were referred to in 
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the examinat~on of defendants' witness·es, he permitted 
counsel for plaintiff to -cross-examine such witnesses 
thereon (Ab. 113, 116, 117), and in considering the case, 
and in the Findings of Faci, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree, he treated and considered the same as independ-
ent a;nd substantive evidence in the case, and predicated 
some of ihis ~chief Findings and portions :of his Decree 
squarely upon rthe maps and drawings, and the dimen-
sions and figure'S therein shown. 
As previously noted, -counsel for plaintiff, upon the 
presentation of the motion for a new trial, affirmatively 
admitted that these maps and drawings were us·ed to 
provide certain of the metes and bounds description set 
forth in the Findings, Conclusions and Decree. Counsel 
admitted that such des-criptions were taken from these 
maps and drawings, which he referred to as ''the rail-
r,oad maps and the insurance maps in evidence' '-that 
the figures appearing on these maps were used to make 
up such descriptions, and ''in. some itnstances a sc·ale W"as 
used to determi;ne them" (Ah. 178-180), and thus it ap-
pears that no matter what the court's purpos·e was in 
receiving .such maps and drawings in evidence, they were 
actually and in point of fact used as substantive and in-
dependent evidence in the ca·se, and the Findings and 
Decree were actually predicated thereon. 
It is our position that under the facts and showing 
in the case, these maps and drawings were not receivable 
for any purpose-they were not receivable as any wit-
nesses' testimony, and it was improper and erroneous 
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for the court to permit cross-examination of defendants' 
witnesses thereon as was done-but even if ·such maps 
and drawings could have been properly received to il-
lustrate the testimony of the witnesse·s who testified con-
cerning them, they were not receivable as substantive or 
independent evidence. A·s above stated, there was no 
evidence or showing that such maps and drawings were 
correct and accurate, and it was, therefore, prejudicial 
error •to receive the same in evidence a·s and to trea.t 
the same as substantive and independent evidence, and 
to base the Findings and Decree thereon, and such Find-
ings and Decree ·SO based thereon, therefore, ought not 
to be permitted to stand. 
OONCLUBION. 
POINT F. As hereinbefore pointed out, the trial 
court in his Findings and Decree herein has disregarded 
and found contrary to the express terms and provisi1ons 
of the grants and reservations in the deeds in question, 
and has disregarded and found contrary to the admitted 
facts and undisputed testimony in the case, and has en-
tered a Decree herein whi1ch is plainly erroneous and con-
trary to law and the admitted facts ~and evidence in the 
ease. 
This Court has repeatedly held that a trial court 
IS not at li,berty to disregard undisputed documentary 
and other evidence in the case, or to ignore admitted facts 
and creditable, uncontradicted, unimpeached or unim-
paired testimony and evidence, and make a finding con-
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trary thereto. As said by this Court in Wilcox v. Cloward, 
et al., 88 Utah 503; 
''The trial cowrt is not at liberty to disregarrd 
creditable, UJ'n).contradicted, wnimpeached, or unim-
paired evidence and 'make a. findvn.g contra;ry there-
to. Parker v. Weber Cownty Irrigation District, 
68 Utah 472, 251 P. 11." 
To like effect see Gia.uque v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utaih 
89; Eastrnan v. Gu.rrey, 15 Utah 410; Hathaway v. United 
Tintic Mines Co., 42 Utah 520; Spring Creek Irr. Co. v. 
Zollinger, 58 Utah 90; Rick v. W eUs Fargo Co., 39 Utah 
130; and Parker v. Weber County Irr. Dist., 68 Utah 472. 
This, we submit, is exactly what the trial court did 
in this ~ca.se, in a. plain and p•alpable intent to rewrite the 
terms of the grants and reservations ·of defendants' ease-
ments, rights of way and other rights and privileges over 
and in and concerning pl~aintiff's property, and to thereby 
relieve the same of the major portion of the burden im-
pos·ed upon such pr1operty by such grant.s and reserva-
tions. 
As said In Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines Co., 
supra: 
"The finding of ~acts and entering of judgments 
are .solemn act.s, and no eourt ·should permit itself 
to make a finding of fact where the record is con-
clusive, as in this case, that there is absolutelY 
no evidenee to support such finding. '' ~ 
For the reasons and booause of the manif~t errors 
assigned and hereinbefore pointed out, we submit that 
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the judgment and decree appealed from is erroneous, 
contrary to law and the evidence in the case, and .should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HURD & HURD, 
MoYLE, RICHARDs & McKAY, 
JuDD, RAY, QuiNNEY & NEBEKER, 
Attorneys for Appella;rds. 
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